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LANDLORDS OF LAST RESORT: SHOULD THE
GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIZE THE MORTGAGES OF
PRIVATELY-OWNED, SMALL MULTIFAMILY
BUILDINGS?
DAVID REISS*
INTRODUCTION
For a large part of the twentieth century, the absence of stable
financing has caused difficulties for owners of small, urban, multifamily
buildings.1 Toward the end of the twentieth century, the secondary
market for multifamily mortgages matured, which has increased to some
extent the availability of credit for small-apartment-building owners.2
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. This Article was presented at Western New
England College School of Law‘s 2008 ―Entrepreneurship in a Global Economy‖ Conference.
I would like to thank Stacy Caplow, Arlo Chase, Nestor Davidson, Steven Dean, and Ken
Levy, as well as participants in a Brooklyn Law School faculty workshop, for helpful
comments. I would also like to thank Jason Gang, William Garrett, and Philip Tucker for
superb research assistance. The author also acknowledges the support of the Brooklyn Law
School Summer Research Stipend Program. Finally, I would like to thank the staff of the
Brooklyn Law School library for help locating a variety of difficult-to-find sources.
1. See, e.g., GEORGE STERNLIEB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD 196-202 (1966) (calling
for, among other things, longer term mortgage money in order to stabilize urban tenement
buildings). Unless otherwise noted, I use the term ―multifamily housing‖ to refer to buildings
containing more than four units. This distinction is necessary because, historically, the
Federal Housing Administration, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac refer to buildings with five or
more units as ―multifamily‖ and grouped two- to four-unit buildings with single-family
homes. William Apgar & Shekar Narasimhan, Enhancing Access to Capital for Smaller
Unsubsidized Multifamily Rental Properties 1 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ.,
Paper
No.
RR07-8,
2007),
available
at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/rental/revisiting_rental_symposium/papers/rr078_apgar.pdf. Where noted, I may refer to buildings with two- to four-units as multifamily as
well. See Emily N. Zietz, Multifamily Housing: A Review of Theory and Evidence, 25 J. REAL
EST. RES. 185, 186 (2003) (cataloging various definitions of ―multifamily housing‖).
2. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., MEETING MULTIFAMILY
HOUSING FINANCE NEEDS DURING AND AFTER THE CREDIT CRISIS: A POLICY BRIEF 4 (2009)
[hereinafter MEETING MULTIFAMILY HOUSING FINANCE NEEDS], available at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/multifamily_housing_finance_needs.pdf
(―The multifamily finance system in the United States is effective, credit-worthy, and unlike
the single-family system has maintained strong underwriting throughout the decade.‖). The
Joint Center study focuses on the impact of the credit crisis on the multifamily sector. See
generally id. This Article does not directly address the impact of the ongoing credit crisis on
1
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At the same time, the small-apartment-building housing stock is
shrinking due to abandonment, demolition, foreclosure, and other
causes.3 Because small apartment buildings house many low-income
families, scholars affiliated with Harvard University‘s Joint Center for
Housing Studies (the ―Joint Center‖) have suggested that financing costs
for the owners of such buildings should be subsidized in order to protect
this affordable housing stock and its occupants. The most welldeveloped proposal arising from this sentiment is for the federal
government to sponsor small Real Estate Investment Trusts (S-REITs) to
pool ownership of multiple properties, which would allow smallbuilding owners to accrue a number of significant government
subsidies.4
There is, however, no major market failure in the mortgage market
for small multifamily buildings even though such mortgages tend to be
more expensive than mortgages for large multifamily buildings.5
Moreover, available subsidies are likely to be used more efficiently if
larger buildings were subsidized because the underwriting of mortgages
has high fixed costs.6 Finally, it is unclear if landlords will pass on a
meaningful portion of the subsidy to tenants. Thus, such a proposal
should not be implemented.
This Article has two goals. First, to provide as thorough a history
of the small-apartment owner and small multifamily properties as can be
cobbled together from the existing literature. This will fill the need for a
comprehensive overview of this important, yet relatively unexplored,
portion of the housing stock. And second, to use the S-REIT proposal as
a lens with which to evaluate the role the government should play in the
continued viability of this segment of the housing stock.
This Article proceeds as follows. First, it describes what little is
known about the owners of small multifamily properties and the
properties themselves. Second, it describes the lending environment
faced by real-estate entrepreneurs over the last hundred years. Finally, it
concludes by arguing against proposals to implement affordable housing

the multifamily housing sector. Rather, it addresses structural issues that preceded—and in all
likelihood will follow—the credit crisis.
3. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., AMERICA‘S RENTAL
HOUSING: THE KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POLICY 20 (2008) [hereinafter AMERICA‘S
RENTAL HOUSING: THE KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POLICY], available at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/rental/rh08_americas_rental_housing/rh08_america
s_rental_housing.pdf.
4. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 115-118 and accompanying text.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 54-55.
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goals by subsidizing small-apartment-building owners.
I.

THE SMALL-MULTIFAMILY-PROPERTY OWNER AND THE SMALL
MULTIFAMILY PROPERTY

Owners of small, urban, multifamily buildings are often thought of
as ―slumlords.‖ George Sternlieb and Robert Burchell challenged the
image of the ―slumlord‖ as the most appropriate one to describe the
typical small-time landlord.7 This is because the small-apartmentbuilding owner is not a homogenous category. While the category does
include the archetypical slumlord, it also includes the occupant-owner of
a very small multi-unit building; the amateur real-estate investor who
invests excess capital in a tax-advantaged real-estate transaction; the
realtor or other real-estate professional whose business expands to
include management and ownership of real estate; the first-generation
immigrant looking to enter the middle class through ownership of real
estate; the absentee, and typically passive, investor; as well as the
speculator.8 And indeed, as the vitality of cities has increased from the
mid-twentieth century to the early twenty-first century, the ―slumlord‖
has begun to give way to the ―urban pioneer‖ as a prevailing image we
have of the owner of small, urban rental properties.9
7. GEORGE STERNLIEB & ROBERT W. BURCHELL, RESIDENTIAL ABANDONMENT: THE
TENEMENT LANDLORD REVISITED 54 (1973); see also LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT
AND SLUM HOUSING: A CENTURY OF FRUSTRATION 39 (1968) (arguing that the ―tenement
house movement helped fix [the slumlord] in his permanent position as an American devil and
scapegoat‖); Michael A. Stegman, Slumlords and Public Policy, 33 J. AM. INST. PLAN. 419,
421 (1967) (stating that George Sternlieb helps ―dispel[] the myth of slumlords as a
monolithic group of misanthropes who derive their livelihoods in units of human suffering
rather than in dollars of rental receipts‖).
8. See MICHAEL A. STEGMAN, HOUSING INVESTMENT IN THE INNER CITY: THE
DYNAMICS OF DECLINE 27 (1972) (finding a similarly diverse group of landlords, although
with greater concentration of ownership among real-estate professionals, in study of
Baltimore); STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 121-84 (describing many types of multifamilybuilding owners found in his study of Newark); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 7 (reviewing
studies from multiple jurisdictions that demonstrated that many slum landlords lived in or near
their properties); Alan Mallach, Landlords at the Margins: Exploring the Dynamics of the One
to Four Unit Rental Housing Industry 23 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Paper
No.
RR07-15,
2007),
available
at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/rental/revisiting_rental_symposium/papers/rr0715_mallach.pdf (arguing that in ―the final analysis, there is no such thing as a typical owner‖
of one- to four-unit properties). Another often overlooked type of owner is the ―inadvertent‖
landlord who had initially purchased the rental building (often a single-family) as her primary
residence, only to move on to another property while retaining the first as an investment. Id.
at 27-28.
9. See STERNLIEB & BURCHELL, supra note 7, at 53 (describing the folk figure of the
slumlord as an ―overfed individual‖ who is ―securing a more than adequate return on his
properties‖). In the popular imagination, rental housing is most often located in urban areas.
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There are few facts that we know about these landlords in general
(a category that also includes owners of single-unit rental properties).10
Indeed, the absolute breadth of the ―landlord‖ class seems to bear out the
fact that no one stereotype can capture the entirety: some 4.3 million
households reported earning rental income from a second property (not
necessarily multifamily) in the 2001 Residential Finance Survey. 11 The
And, indeed, the facts bear this out: more than half of all rental units are located within ten
miles of the central business districts of the ninety-one largest metro regions in the country.
JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING
22 (2006) [hereinafter THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2006)], available at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2006/son2006.pdf.
Moreover,
California, Florida, New York, and Texas, the four most populous states, ―account for 41
percent of multifamily properties and 42 percent of multifamily units.‖ Amy S. Bogdon &
James R. Follain, Multifamily Housing: An Exploratory Analysis Using the 1991 Residential
Finance Survey, 7 J. HOUSING RES. 79, 84 (1996). The ―urban pioneer‖ is a bit of catchall
slang for those who choose to move to ―transitional areas.‖ See MICH. DEP‘T OF LABOR &
ECON. GROWTH, 2005 COOL CITIES GRANTS & PLANNING PROGRAMS PRE-BID WORKSHOP
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2005) (on file with author), defining ―urban pioneer‖ as
a person who had vision for a blighted urban area who moved into the area and
worked to restore the neighborhood. We now think of the term to describe anyone
who lives in an urban neighborhood or moves to an urban neighborhood to either
restore or maintain it. Some of those urban pioneers are empty nesters, young
knowledge workers, developers, immigrants, creative workforce, or persons with
passion for their city who believe in building or rebuilding a vibrant community.
No matter what age a person is, one who moves into a transitional area to be part of
the rebirth of that neighborhood. An urban pioneer can also be a developer who is
investing in the neighborhood.
Id.
10. There is really a surprising lack of research in this area, a problem that goes back
quite far into the twentieth century. See, e.g., J. E. MORTON, URBAN MORTGAGE LENDING:
COMPARATIVE MARKETS AND EXPERIENCE 16 (1956) (noting that it is typically impossible to
disaggregate multifamily finance data from commercial and industrial finance data); Arthur D.
Sporn, Empirical Studies in the Economics of Slum Ownership, 36 LAND ECON. 333, 333
(1960) (―[S]eriously documented studies of the economics of owning and renting substandard
housing are rare.‖); see also James R. Follain, Some Possible Directions for Research on
Multifamily Housing, 5 HOUSING POL‘Y DEBATE, 533, 543 (1994) (noting that academic
literature on multifamily housing and multifamily housing finance is scarce); Kerry D.
Vandell, Multifamily Finance: A Pathway to Housing Goals, a Bridge to Commercial
Mortgage Market Efficiency, 11 J. HOUSING RES. 319, 320 (2000) (noting that there is less
data available on conditions in the multifamily market than on the single-family market); cf.
COMMUNITY HOUSING IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM [CHIP], PHASE 2 STUDY: EXPANDED
SURVEY OF OWNERS OF RENT STABILIZED PROPERTY 14 (2009) (report prepared by
Urbanomics, on file with author) (noting that ―[r]elatively little data has been collected on
individual owners of rent stabilized properties throughout [New York] City‖ and that the
present study only represents the ―[Rent Stabilization Association] certified member
universe‖).
11. THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2006), supra note 9, at 23. Of the 4.3
million who earn rental income, 3.4 million report owning only one rental property and at
least one third of that 3.4 million own a single-family rental unit. Id. The 2001 Residential
Finance Survey is part of the decennial U.S. Census. See Residential Finance Survey—
Overview, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/rfs/overview.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2010). It

REISS 10

2010]

6/25/2010 12:16 PM

LANDLORDS OF LAST RESORT

5

survey also found that individuals and married couples owned 19.3
million rental units, including eighty-four percent of one- to four-unit
properties and sixty-five percent of five- to nineteen-unit properties.12
These owners tend, unsurprisingly, to be older and wealthier than the
general population at large,13 although a surprisingly large number of
owners are low-income themselves.14
Small ―multifamily rentals are likely to be owned by individuals
with few property holdings.‖15 Owners of smaller properties typically
manage their properties themselves in order to save on the fees that
would have to be paid to a professional manager.16 That being said, for
most of these owners, managing their properties is at most a part-time
job.17 Not infrequently, they reside in their properties.18
should be noted that there are few sources of data about landlords that are regularly updated.
As such, this Article will make reference to various studies from the last twenty years. The
reader should rely on the older studies with care, as the multifamily market has changed
significantly during that period.
12. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S
HOUSING 21 (2007) [hereinafter THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2007)], available at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2007/son2007.pdf.
Business
organizations and other institutions owned 15.6 million rental units. Id.; JOINT CTR. FOR
HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., AMERICA‘S RENTAL HOUSING: HOMES FOR A DIVERSE
NATION 22 (2006) [hereinafter AMERICA‘S RENTAL HOUSING: HOMES FOR A DIVERSE
NATION],
available
at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/rental/rh06_americas_rental_housing.pdf
(―According to the Property Owners and Managers Survey (POMS)—perhaps the most
comprehensive look at owner characteristics—most individuals have fewer than ten rental
units, and many have just one.‖). For a thorough study of the one- to four-family housing
stock, see Mallach, supra note 8. Mallach finds that ―[n]early half of all owners of single
family detached rental properties own only a single property, with another quarter owning two
to four properties, while 70 percent of the owners of two-family rental properties own either
one or two properties.‖ Id. at 19. Individuals and couples own in excess of eighty percent of
all one- to four-family rental units. Id. at 20; see also LENORE SCHLOMING & SKIP
SCHLOMING, THE ROAD HOME: WORKING WITH SMALL PROPERTY OWNERS TO PRESERVE
AND
CREATE
AFFORDABLE
RENTAL
HOUSING,
available
at
http://www.pioneerinstitute.org/pdf/bgc_roadhome.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2010).
13. THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2007), supra note 12, at 21.
14. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S
HOUSING 23 (2002) [hereinafter THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2002)], available at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/Son2002.pdf (―Many nonresident owners
of nine or fewer rental units have low incomes themselves, with almost a third reporting
annual incomes of under $30,000.‖).
15. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S
HOUSING 21 (2001) [hereinafter THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2001)], available at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/SON2001.pdf.
16. THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2006), supra note 9, at 24.
17. THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 23; see also
Mallach, supra note 8, at 20 (noting that about three-fourths of owners of one- to fourfamily rental units work in a field unrelated to property ownership and only a handful of such
owners earn all of their income from property ownership). A recent Joint Center paper argues
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There is also some useful data about smaller multifamily properties
themselves, as distinct from the owners of such properties.19 These
smaller properties make up a large share of the multifamily market:
buildings with fewer than fifty units make up 88.5% of multifamily
properties, and those with fewer than twenty units make up 74.9% of
multifamily properties.20 While small buildings make up the bulk of all
multifamily buildings, they make up a much smaller portion of total
multifamily units: only about one-third of multifamily rental units are in
five- to forty-nine-unit buildings.21
Small rental properties tend to be significantly older than larger
ones. Older properties tend to be in poorer condition and are thus
typically more expensive to maintain, with the cost compounded by the
fact that they typically house lower-income residents.22 Of course, such
tenants are less able to pay increased rent for improved maintenance.
The units in this sector thus tend to be more affordable than units in
larger buildings; this affordability is not surprising given their

for experimentation with ownership models for smaller properties as owners of such
properties face a host of problems with them. Revisiting Rental Housing Policy: Observations
from a National Summit 17 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Working Paper No.
W07-2,
2007),
available
at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/rental/revisiting_rental_symposium/w072_revisiting_rental_policy_brief.pdf [hereinafter Revisiting Rental Housing Policy].
18. THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 23 (using 1997
data).
19. For a brief history of the multifamily housing stock, see ADRIENNE SCHMITZ ET
AL., MULTIFAMILY HOUSING DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK 8-16 (2000).
20. CHRISTOPHER E. HERBERT, A BT ASSOCS. INC ., AN ASSESSMENT OF THE
AVAILABILITY AND COST OF FINANCING FOR SMALL MULTIFAMILY PROPERTIES 5 (2001),
available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/smallmultifamily.pdf (using data from
HUD
PROPERTY
OWNERS
AND
MANAGERS
SURVEY
(1996),
http://www.huduser.org/DATASETS/poms.html).
21. MEETING MULTIFAMILY HOUSING FINANCE NEEDS, supra note 2, at 7.
22. See THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 22-23; Jack
Goodman, Determinants of Operating Costs of Multifamily Rental Housing 20 (Joint Ctr. for
Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. W04-7, 2004), available at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/w04-7.pdf (estimating that utility costs are
fifty-five percent less at properties built in 1990s than for similar properties built in 1970s);
see also Ann B. Schnare, The Impact of Changes in Multifamily Housing Finance on Older
Urban Areas 4 (Brookings Inst., Ctr. on Urban and Metro. Policy & Joint Ctr. for Hous.
Studies
of
Harvard
Univ.,
2001),
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/schnarefinal.pdf (noting that households living in the
multifamily housing stock tend to be younger and poorer ―than the average American
household‖). For a discussion of the characteristics of the middle market for rentals, see
J OINT CTR . FOR HOUS. S TUDIES OF H ARVARD UNIV ., MIDDLE MARKET R ENTALS:
HIDING
IN
P LAIN
SIGHT
(2004),
available
at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/mmr04-1_middle_market_rentals.pdf.
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condition.23
Small multifamily properties themselves are
disproportionately located in communities with lower-income residents,
higher poverty rates, and lower homeownership rates.24
This
combination of higher operating costs and lower rents makes smaller
multifamily buildings a less attractive investment opportunity, all other
things being equal.
The small multifamily subsector offers opportunities to burgeoning
entrepreneurs but also carries great risks.25 As the Joint Center has
noted, many of these units are ―owned by individuals with limited
capacity to maintain and manage rental properties. Moreover, even the
most sophisticated owners of smaller rental properties find it difficult to
secure funds to maintain or upgrade their units.‖26
As a result, ―[f]or many of these landlords, the ventures are
unprofitable: in 1995, thirty-two percent of owners with fewer than 10
units reported losses on their investments.‖27 Given all of this bad news
about owning rental units, it comes as no surprise that well over half of
small nonresident owners would not have purchased their properties if
they could do it all over again.28 Notwithstanding this state of affairs,

23. See THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 23; William
Segal, Segmentation in the Multifamily Mortgage Market: Evidence from the Residential
Finance Survey, 13 J. HOUSING RES. 175, 178 (2003). The Bureau of the Census‘s 1991
Survey of Residential Finance found that rents in five- to forty-nine-unit properties were
eighty-four percent of rents in larger properties. HERBERT, supra note 20, at 1.
24. Bogdon & Follain, supra note 9, at 114.
25. Owner-occupants of two- to four-unit buildings are more likely to be ―urban, bluecollar, and less affluent than single-family homeowners.‖ See Mallach, supra note 8, at 21.
They are also more likely to be people of color. Id.
26. THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 23.
27. THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2001), supra note 15, at 21; see also Amy
S. Bogdon & David C. Ling, The Effects of Property, Owner, Location and Tenant
Characteristics on Multifamily Profitability, 9 J. HOUSING RES. 285, 314 (1998) (a study of
multifamily properties, finding that ―[p]roperties held by nonprofits and corporations are less
profitable, all else equal, than those held by other ownership structures‖). Owner-occupiers,
however, have fewer losses, with only fourteen percent of them reporting losses in 1995. Id.
The Joint Center analysis does not appear to take into account the extent to which some
investors purchase property with the express intent of incurring operating losses to offset
current income and with the hope of future capital gains. See, e.g., HENRY J. AARON,
SHELTER AND SUBSIDIES 66 (1972) (noting that major tax benefits available to owners of
rental property is depreciation deduction in excess of actual decrease in fair market value);
Kathy M. Kristof, A Primer on Real Estate Tax Breaks, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 2002, at U9
(―[D]epreciation expenses frequently reflect phantom costs that can be used to shelter
otherwise taxable income.‖); see also ANTHONY DOWNS, RENTAL HOUSING IN THE 1980‘S
48-49 (1983) (describing tax-advantaged status in the early 1980s of real-estate investments
over alternate investments).
28. THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 23. One imagines
that this figure has only increased during the Great Recession.
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landlords of small rental properties also tend to hold them for a long
time, although the speculation that was rampant in the early 2000s may
have altered this pattern.29
While it is unlikely that many small-apartment-building owners
purchase buildings in order to provide affordable housing to low- and
moderate-income people, policymakers and affordable-housing
advocates have identified such owners as key players in affordablehousing policy. Indeed, the Joint Center writes that the ―fate of the
affordable housing supply . . . relies critically on finding ways to assist
these small property owners in preserving rental buildings.‖30 Because
of fixed transaction costs, however, it is more expensive on a per-unit
basis—thus much less common—to subsidize owners of smaller
multifamily properties as opposed to owners of larger multifamily
properties.31 The Joint Center‘s William Apgar and Shekar Narasimhan
argue that because new production is directed at larger buildings, small
multifamily buildings are ―at risk of loss to disinvestment, demolition
and abandonment.‖32
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SMALL MULTIFAMILY MORTGAGE FINANCE
Loan underwriting had historically been a very local activity, one
that was based on a careful evaluation of an individual‘s financial
prospects, reliability, and place within the community. Local thrifts, in
particular, were very active in small multifamily lending, until the
29. See Mallach, supra note 8, at 22 (finding that the typical owner of one- to four-unit
properties in 2001 has owned property for nine years); see also STERNLIEB & BURCHELL,
supra note 7, at 55 (finding that nearly forty percent of buildings in a study of Newark ―have
been in the same hands for eleven or more years‖).
30. THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2007), supra note 12, at 22. This is an
issue that disparately impacts communities of color. Id. In 2005, the minority share of renter
households was forty-three percent and growing. Id.
31. THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 23 (noting that
―major supply-side housing assistance programs—including the Low-Income Housing Tax
Credit—typically provide subsidies to larger properties, even though most renters needing
assistance live in smaller properties‖); Donald S. Bradley et al., An Examination of Mortgage
Debt Characteristics and Financial Risk Among Multifamily Properties, 10 J. HOUSING.
ECON. 482, 487 (2001) (noting that smaller properties ―are also less likely to receive direct
government assistance, including Section 8, the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, government
grants and/or property tax relief‖ and that ―[o]nly thirty-four percent of small properties
reported that they receive some type of government assistance, compared to fifty-six percent
of large developments‖).
32. Apgar & Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 3; see also Stegman, supra note 7, at 419
(―While national policy is committed to the goal of providing every American family with a
decent home, one extremely scarce housing resource, the low-rent sector of the privately
owned housing inventory, is being squandered.‖). Apgar and Narasimhan‘s point applies just
as much to housing preservation efforts to the extent that they too focus on large projects.
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savings-and-loan crisis and the real-estate downturn of the 1980s
reduced their activity in this area.33 Since the 1980s, however, there has
been a great change in multifamily property finance as the commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) industry took off. This movement
from local to global mortgage funding had a profound impact on the
financing options available for small multifamily properties.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, entrepreneurs,
particularly those who were different in some way (real or perceived)
from their local bankers, faced great difficulty in obtaining financing
from their local banks.34 This difficulty was intensified in inner-city
areas.35 In the absence of financing from established lenders, more
sympathetic savings and loans arose in established immigrant
communities.36 Borrowers also turned to informal lenders who would
lend within a particular ethnic group.37 These so-called ―immigrant
lenders‖ gave ―many simple shopkeepers and small-scale entrepreneurs
ready access to large pools of capital and . . . they overwhelmingly
invested these funds in local real estate either as unlicensed lenders or as
direct builders and purchasers.‖38 Because of the lack of access to
33. See Denise DiPasquale & Jean L. Cummings, Financing Multifamily Rental
Housing: The Changing Role of Lenders and Investors, 3 HOUSING POL‘Y DEBATE 77, 78
(1992); James R. Follain & Edward J. Szymanoski, A Framework for Evaluating
Government’s Evolving Role in Multifamily Mortgage Markets, 1 CITYSCAPE: J. POL‘Y DEV.
& RES. 151, 151-52 (1995); see also Apgar & Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 7 (―Indeed, by
2001, S&Ls provided just 17.2 percent of financing to properties with 5 to 49 units, compared
to 36.9 percent in 1991.‖).
34. Jared N. Day, Credit, Capital and Community: Informal Banking in Immigrant
Communities in the United States, 1880–1924, 9 FIN. HIST. REV. 65, 65 (2002) (noting that
immigrants were not usually welcomed at traditional banks); see also SAM B. WARNER, JR.,
STREETCAR SUBURBS: THE PROCESS OF GROWTH IN BOSTON, 1870-1900, at 117-24 (1961)
(describing typically complex financing of residential projects in late nineteenth century).
35. See STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 196.
36. DAVID L. MASON, FROM BUILDINGS AND LOANS TO BAIL-OUTS: A HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY, 1831-1995, at 54-56 (2004).
37. Day, supra note 34, at 65. Indeed, Henry, Emmanuel, and Mayer Lehman began in
the informal immigrant banking world before founding Lehman Brothers, as did A.P.
Giannini, the founder of Bank of America. Id. at 77.
38. JARED N. DAY, URBAN CASTLES 40 (Kenneth T. Jackson ed., 1999). One 1920
federal report observed that ―real estate, first and second mortgages, and speculative securities
were favored forms of investment. Such holdings are almost uniformly the heaviest assets of
the [immigrant] banker.‖
Id. at 40-41; see LOUIS WINNICK, RENTAL HOUSING:
OPPORTUNITIES FOR PRIVATE INVESTMENT 159 (1958).
Frequently the small investor of past decades was a modest businessman or even a
worker, often of foreign heritage, who regarded the purchase of a new residential
property from his lifetime savings as providing not only a place to live, but also
added personal status, a retirement income, and, with luck and rising prices, an
estate for his children.
Id.; STEGMAN, supra note 8, at 41 (―Many of the smaller landlords are first-generation
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traditional lenders, immigrant lenders became ―critical sources of capital
for local real estate investment.‖39
Starting around World War I, the role of the immigrant lender in
multifamily investment began to be displaced by competition from
insurance and title companies, as well as other lenders.40 And over the
course of the Great Depression, with its concomitant wave of
foreclosures, many landlords lost their buildings.41 These trends
initiated the professionalization of the multifamily real-estate industry,
as many individual owners were shaken out, one way or another.42 This
trend continued in the Post-War period, accompanied by more and more
government involvement in multifamily finance.43
Another significant ownership trend developed in the 1960s,
whereby many African Americans purchased central-city, multifamily
properties and used the housing for residential as well as income
purposes.44
This trend was accompanied by the widespread
abandonment of central-city housing by many absentee owners in the
1960s and 1970s as buildings stopped producing sufficient income even
to cover the basic costs of taxes and utilities, let alone insurance,
financing, and maintenance expenses.45 As many cities became unstable
in the 1960s, private lenders became scarce in the multifamily market.46
Americans . . . .‖).
39. DAY, supra note 38, at 41 (―[E]vidence suggests that the overall volume of
[immigrant lenders‘] economic activity may have been staggering.‖).
40. Id. (noting that regulation drove out some immigrant lenders); see Donald S.
Bradley et al., Financing Multifamily Properties: A Play with New Actors and New Lines, 4
CITYSCAPE: J. POL‘Y DEV. & RES. 5, 11 (1998) (discussing the developing role of insurers
and other new players in the multifamily mortgage market).
41. DAY, supra note 38, at 176-177.
42. Id. Louis Winnick noted that one estimate in the 1950s found that ―the proportion
of apartment mortgage debt held by institutional lenders rose from about 50 [percent] at the
end of the twenties to 80 [percent] in the mid-fifties.‖ WINNICK, supra note 38, at 160.
43. See MORTON, supra note 10, at 48-70 (providing detailed history of growth and
structure of lending industry through early 1950s); WINNICK, supra note 38, at 155.
44. STERNLIEB & BURCHELL, supra note 7, at 97.
45. See, e.g., STERNLIEB & B URCHELL, supra note 7, at 269-352 (studying
abandonment in Newark); THE NEW YORK CITY RAND INSTITUTE, RENTAL HOUSING IN NEW
YORK CITY 9-11 (Ira S. Lowry ed., 1970) [hereinafter RENTAL HOUSING IN NEW YORK
CITY]; David J. Reiss, Housing Abandonment and New York City’s Response, 22 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 783 (1996). The abandonment crisis was most severe in the East, as broad
demographic changes drove jobs and people to other parts of the country. See Harold L.
Bunce & Sue G. Neal, Trends in City Conditions During the 1970s: A Survey of Demographic
and Socioeconomic Changes, 14 PUBLIUS 7, 8-10 (1984).
46. See, e.g., STEGMAN, supra note 8, at 197 (―In Baltimore, too, the absence of
mortgage capital is a critical factor in the declining inner-city market . . . .‖); STERNLIEB &
B URCHELL, supra note 7, at xxv (―Primary lenders in urban areas—commercial and mutual
savings banks, savings and loan associations, insurance companies, and even individuals—are
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Even after cities recovered from the abandonment crisis, the multifamily
market continued with a cycle of booms and busts—most notably the
late-1980s to early-1990s bust and the late-1990s and early-2000s
boom—followed by the bust in which we now find ourselves.47
Historically, the available private-sector lending was unattractive
from the multi-unit landlord‘s perspective.48 Throughout much of the
twentieth century, private multifamily mortgages had been short term,
requiring a borrower to refinance frequently and face the risk that the
interest-rate environment might become unfavorable.49 Such an unstable
lending environment can lead to a depressed real-estate market as
owners lose faith in their ability to sell their property because potential
buyers are unable to arrange for financing.50
Owners of smaller multifamily properties seem to find their
financing options even less attractive, as seen from the fact that such
buildings are mortgaged less often than larger multifamily properties.51
Mortgages secured by smaller properties also tend to have higher interest

getting out of the inner city mortgage lending business. They are replaced by mortgage
companies which deal almost exclusively in insured loans.‖); see also RENTAL HOUSING IN
NEW YORK CITY, supra note 45, at 9 (―[I]nstitutional investors are, as rapidly as possible,
reducing their portfolios of controlled housing and of housing in deteriorated
neighborhoods.‖).
47. Lawrence Goldberg & Charles A. Capone, Jr., Multifamily Mortgage Credit Risk:
Lessons from Recent History, 4 CITYSCAPE: J. POL‘Y DEV. & RES. 93, 95 (1998) (discussing
tax and accounting aspects of booms and busts of 1980s-2000s); Segal, supra note 23, at 178
(discussing the 1980s and 1990s bust); Prabha Natarajan, Real-Estate Finance: Apartments
Try to Stay Afloat, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2009, at C11 (reporting on rising mortgage defaults
for multifamily properties).
48. See STERNLIEB & BURCHELL, supra note 7, at 237. The authors note,
The availability of institutional financing is one of the major determinants of the
health and vitality of the real estate market. If the banks, savings and loan
companies, insurance companies, and the like are willing to lend in an area, then
owners can have confidence that their investments in properties are redeemable
through ultimate resale or remortgaging.
Id.
49. GEORGE STERNLIEB & JAMES W. HUGHES, THE FUTURE OF RENTAL HOUSING 89
(1981).
50. Id. at 87-89.
51. Segal, supra note 23, at 179-80 (noting that owners of smaller buildings are more
likely to rely on relational financing from depository institutions). The lower rate of
mortgages for smaller buildings may also be explained in part by the fact that smaller
buildings are easier to buy in an all-cash transaction and that smaller mortgages can be paid in
full more easily. Finally, it is unclear what the socially optimal rate of financing for
multifamily buildings is, so it may or may not be that the lower proportion of mortgages for
smaller buildings is actually undesirable. That being said, many of the commentators
discussed herein take the position that the small multifamily sector has a more difficult time
obtaining financing than other sectors of the mortgage market.
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rates,52 and they have adjustable interest rates more frequently than
mortgages secured by larger properties; this exposes them to interest-rate
risk.53
One major reason for the different mortgage terms for small and
large properties is that the underwriting of any commercial mortgage is
associated with significant fixed costs.54 These underwriting costs,
payable to third-party providers, can exceed $10,000 and typically
include charges for appraisals, environmental reviews, and attorney
certifications.55 Because the small-apartment-building lender has to
recoup those costs from a smaller principal base, there will be higher
upfront fees or a higher interest rate, which will allow the lender to
amortize those fixed costs over time.56
As a result of the unattractive terms available in the private,
multifamily mortgage market generally, the government sector has
sought to expand financing options.57 Various government programs

52. HERBERT, supra note 20, at 13. Small multifamily properties also tend to pay
significantly higher mortgage rates. Bradley, supra note 31, at 502 (estimating that rates on
small properties are about 100 basis points higher than rates on large developments); see also
Drew Schneider & James Follain, A New Initiative in the Federal Housing Administration’s
Office of Multifamily Housing Programs: An Assessment of Small Projects Processing, 4
CITYSCAPE: J. POL‘Y DEV. & RES. 43, 49 (1998) (noting that, in some cases, smaller
multifamily mortgages are as much as 300 basis points higher).
53. HERBERT, supra note 20, at 13-14. Interest-rate risk is the risk that the payments a
company owes on short-term debt that funds purchases become mismatched with the interest
payments it receives in turn from its long-term investments. David Reiss, The Federal
Government’s Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac’s Obligations: Uncle Sam
Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1031 (2008).
54. Schneider & Follain, supra note 52, at 49-50; see also HERBERT, supra note 20, at
iv (arguing that higher interest rates reflect the need to amortize fixed costs over the life of the
loan, the reduced competition in the market segment, and the lack of sophistication of the
borrowers in that segment). Commercial mortgage underwriting primarily focuses on the
ability of the property to cover its monthly expenses and its monthly mortgage expenses in
particular. By way of contrast, residential mortgage underwriting focuses on whether the
borrower has the capacity to repay the loan.
A recent study of community bank underwriting suggests that the use of consumer credit
scores for owners of small businesses—as opposed to reliance on best estimates of the
creditworthiness of the small business itself—may prove a way to expand credit without
increasing credit risk. See Allen N. Berger et al., The Surprising Use of Credit Scoring in
Small Business Lending by Community Banks and the Attendant Effects on Credit Availability
and Risk 1-4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper 2009-9, 2009), available at
http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/wp0909.pdf.
55. See HERBERT, supra note 20, at 15-16.
56. See Bradley et al., supra note 40, at 15 (noting that the fixed costs of loan review
―increase as a percentage of loan balance as loan size decreases‖).
57. See STERNLIEB & HUGHES, supra note 49, at 91 (noting that the government sector
had become a dominant lender in the multifamily sector even though it imposes some terms
that landlords find onerous).
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stepped in to provide more stable lending to such borrowers, including
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), as well as state- and
government-sponsored enterprise programs.58 Because of the high fixed
costs associated with originating and servicing such loans, however,
these government programs faced similar constraints as private lenders.
As a result, these multifamily mortgage programs also have historically
poorly served the smaller multifamily subsector.
A variety of FHA programs provided mortgages, either directly or
indirectly, for multifamily properties.59 The market penetration of these
programs has waxed and waned with changes in the market and the
political environment.60 FHA programs, however, have been frequently
criticized for their high interest rates, slow approval processes, overly
strict underwriting criteria, and relatively short (five-year) terms.61 Over
time, the FHA has also tended to provide financing for larger buildings
as well, in part because of the efficiencies presented by larger projects.62
This was compounded by the fact that owners of smaller properties were
often less likely to know about and access such government programs
because of lack of knowledge about, experience with, and expertise with

58. See id. at 89-91.
59. The FHA provides for mortgages indirectly by offering mortgage insurance to
lenders that insures against losses incurred when borrowers default. ALEX F. SCHWARTZ,
HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 49-50 (2006) (discussing various FHA programs);
EDWARD J. SZYMANOSKI & SUSAN J. DONAHUE, DO FHA MULTIFAMILY MORTGAGE
INSURANCE PROGRAMS PROVIDE AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND SERVE UNDERSERVED
AREAS? 6 (1999); U.S. Dep‘t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Descriptions of Multifamily Programs,
http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/mfh/progdesc/progdesc.cfm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (listing
FHA mortgage insurance origination programs).
60. Vandell, supra note 10, at 323 (noting that ―[b]y 1993, FHA was virtually out of the
multifamily business, making up only 6 percent of multifamily starts‖).
61. See, e.g., STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 186-87, 192-96; WINNICK, supra note 38, at
171; Follain & Szymanoski, supra note 33, at 152-53 (discussing the ―litany of problems‖
with the FHA). The FHA responds to these criticisms on its website. FHA Website,
Dispelling Common Myths About Participating with FHA (on file with author). For a history
of the early FHA, seen from a planning perspective, see MARK A. WEISS, THE RISE OF THE
COMMUNITY BUILDERS: THE AMERICAN REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY AND URBAN LAND
PLANNING 141-158 (1987).
62. See STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 189 (noting that fixed costs could be spread over
more units in larger buildings); Segal, supra note 23, at 189 (noting that the proportion of
small-multifamily mortgages insured by the FHA fell from 39.4% in 1989 to 1.9% in 2002).
In 1997, the FHA announced its Small Projects Processing Program, which was intended to
reach the small-project market that had been marginalized in earlier FHA programs. Id.; see
also Schneider & Follain, supra note 52, at 48 (finding that the FHA‘s standard multifamily
programs ―are prohibitive for financing small projects‖). Vandell does note, however, that the
FHA has focused on smaller projects at various times in its history. Vandell, supra note 10, at
324 (noting that FHA‘s post-war focus was on smaller projects).
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them.63
Many states have housing finance agencies that provide lowinterest loans and long terms in exchange for caps on rents.64 However,
these programs also tend to favor larger projects, because, again, of the
fixed costs associated with them.65 Other state-government programs
directed at property owners are also less often accessed by owners of
smaller multifamily properties.66
The federal government has not taken a strong lead in supporting
small multifamily finance as compared to other mortgage subsectors.67
The Federal National Mortgage Association (commonly known as
―Fannie Mae‖) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(commonly known as ―Freddie Mac‖), the two government-sponsored
enterprises that dominate the conforming residential (owner-occupied)
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) market, first entered the
multifamily market in a significant way in the 1990s.68 Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac have, however, had limited exposure to the small
multifamily sector, tending to put their resources in the large multifamily
sector.69 This is partly because their underwriting and servicing
63. See STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 189.
64. See National Council of State Housing Agencies, HFA Directory,
http://www.ncsha.org/housing-help (last visited Apr. 27, 2010).
65. Schnare, supra note 22, at 21-22 (citing Bradley, supra note 31); see also JUSTIN
COOPER, MULTIFAMILY RENTAL HOUSING: FINANCING WITH TAX-EXEMPT BONDS 21 (2003)
(noting that because the costs of offering tax-exempt bonds ―to the public are largely fixed,
but project sizes and costs vary widely, some transactions are too small to justify the cost of a
public offering‖).
66. Bradley, supra note 31, at 487.
67. See MEETING MULTIFAMILY HOUSING FINANCE NEEDS, supra note 2, at iv. For a
list of federal multifamily finance programs, see SCHMITZ ET AL., supra note 19, at 160. In a
1992 study prepared for HUD, researchers found that ten percent of all units in HUD-insured
multifamily housing properties were in buildings with fewer than fifty units. JAMES E.
WALLACE ET AL., ASSESSMENT OF THE HUD-INSURED MULTIFAMILY HOUSING STOCK 2-4
(1992).
68. See generally DiPasquale & Cummings, supra note 33.
69. MEETING MULTIFAMILY HOUSING FINANCE NEEDS, supra note 2, at 4; see also
Frank E. Nothaft & James L. Freund, The Evolution of Securitization in Multifamily Mortgage
Markets and Its Effect on Lending Rates, 25 J. REAL EST. RES. 91, 91-92 (2003) (describing
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac‘s limited exposure to multifamily sectors, which ―reflected the
nature of the underlying multifamily loans: mortgage contracts were not standardized, the
collateral rental properties were heterogeneous and the geographic concentration of properties
made multifamily lending a more risky undertaking‖). As the Joint Center notes, Fannie and
Freddie typically ―only increased their focus on financing smaller (5-49 unit) multifamily
rental properties temporarily when‖ doing so helped them meet the affordable housing goals
set for them by Congress. MEETING MULTIFAMILY HOUSING FINANCE NEEDS, supra note 2,
at 7; see KIMBERLY BURNETT & LINDA B. FOSBURG, STUDY OF THE MULTIFAMILY
UNDERWRITING AND THE GSES‘ ROLE IN THE MULTIFAMILY MARKET: EXPANDED VERSION,
at x-xi (2001) (noting that the ―GSEs‘ multifamily purchases do not appear to be contributing
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standards often are uneconomical or too stringent for smaller buildings
and their owners.70
Starting in the early 1990s, a vibrant, private, secondary mortgage
market for multifamily housing mortgages also developed.71 At that
time, the Wall Street firms developed so-called ―private-label‖ CMBS
which included multifamily mortgages.72 At the peak of the global
CMBS market in 2007, there was nearly $309 billion in CMBS issued,
of which almost $49 billion, or sixteen percent, was comprised of
multifamily mortgages.73
Securitization works best when the underlying assets are similar
because such similarity reduces due diligence and other costs.74 One of
the main limitations of the multifamily CMBS market is that the
underlying mortgages are not uniform, particularly in the case of smaller
properties.75 This increases the transaction costs for all parties who must
deal with them.76 Furthermore, owners of small properties often do not
keep the kind of records that investors would require in order to invest in
such properties, even at the mortgage-backed pool level.77
consistently to the mitigation of excessive cost of mortgage financing facing small properties
with five to 50 units,‖ but also noting that HUD had implemented an incentive for the GSEs to
become more active in this segment); see also HUD‘s Regulation of the Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(Freddie Mac), 65 Fed. Reg. 65,044, 65,045 (Oct. 31, 2000) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 81
(2009)) (noting that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ―have been much less active in purchasing
mortgages in markets where there is a need for additional financing to address persistent
housing needs including financing for small multifamily rental properties, manufactured
housing, single family owner-occupied rental properties, seasoned affordable housing
mortgages, and older housing in need of rehabilitation‖).
70. Schneider & Follain, supra note 52, at 49.
71. See AMERICA‘S RENTAL HOUSING: THE KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POLICY,
supra note 3, at 14; DiPasquale & Cummings, supra note 33.
72. Kent W. Colton & Kate Collignon, Multifamily Rental Housing in the 21st Century
64 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. W01-1, 2001),
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/colton_w01-1.pdf.
73. COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE ALERT, GLOBAL CMBS ISSUANCE IN 2008 (2008),
available at http://www.cmalert.com/ranking.php?rid=198. Global Multifamily CMBS
issuance grew from $9.9 billion in 2000. COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE ALERT, GLOBAL CMBS
ISSUANCE IN 2001 (2001), available at http://www.cmalert.com/ranking.php?rid=170. It has
since fallen to $2.9 billion in 2008 as a result of the credit crisis. See supra, GLOBAL CMBS
ISSUANCE IN 2008.
74. See Peter M. Carrozzo, Marketing the American Mortgage: The Emergency Home
Finance Act of 1970, Standardization and the Secondary Market Revolution, 39 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 765, 778 (2005) (―Without a standardized mortgage document and uniform
lending techniques, the secondary market never would have gotten off the ground.‖).
75. THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 23; DiPasquale &
Cummings, supra note 33, at 97.
76. DiPasquale & Cummings, supra note 33, at 97.
77. Apgar & Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 2.
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The proportion of multifamily mortgages that had been securitized
since the early 1990s has grown steadily as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
and the private-label sector has gained more experience with the CMBS
market.78 In 1986, less than ten percent of multifamily mortgages were
either held or securitized through the activities of government-sponsored
enterprises (GSEs) like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, federal agencies
like Ginnie Mae, and private securities issuers.79 Just ten years later, in
1996, this number had jumped to twenty-three percent.80 And in 2006,
prior to the credit crisis, roughly forty-five percent of multifamily
mortgages were sold into the secondary mortgage market.81
However, the increase in securitization was concentrated in
mortgages secured by large properties.82 Small multifamily mortgages
78. AMERICA‘S RENTAL HOUSING: THE KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POLICY,
supra note 3, at 14 (―Along with increased standardization of underwriting criteria and loan
documentation, these trends created a larger, more stable, and less expensive source of capital
for rental property owners and developers, while also providing greater diversification for
investors.‖).
79. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS
OF THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS 1985-1994, at 87 tbl.L.219
[hereinafter
FLOW
OF
FUNDS
1985-1994],
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/annuals/a1985-1994.pdf. The calculations
in this paragraph take into account the sum of outstanding multifamily residential mortgage
debt attributed to ―Government-sponsored enterprises,‖ ―Agency- and GSE-backed mortgage
pools,‖ and ―ABS issuers,‖ as compared to the ―Total Liabilities‖ of multifamily residential
mortgage debt.
80. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS
OF THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS 1995-2004, at 87 tbl.L.219,
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/annuals/a1995-2004.pdf.
81. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS
OF THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS 2005-2008, at 87 tbls.L.218 &
L.219
[hereinafter
FLOW
OF
FUNDS
2005-2008],
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/annuals/a2005-2008.pdf.
By way of
contrast, sixty percent of mortgages on one- to four-family properties were sold into the
secondary mortgage market in 2006. Id. This increase in securitization was, of course, at the
expense of traditional players in the commercial mortgage market: the portion of multifamily
mortgages held by commercial banks, savings institutions, and life insurance companies
dropped from sixty-two percent in 1986, FLOW OF FUNDS 1985-1994, supra note 79, at 87
tbl.L219, to forty percent in 2006, FLOW OF FUNDS 2005-2008, supra, at 87 tbl.L.219.
82. AMERICA‘S RENTAL HOUSING: THE KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POLICY,
supra note 3, at 14. The report notes,
[A] dual mortgage delivery system began to emerge. Individuals and investors
seeking to purchase, rehabilitate, or build smaller rental properties were increasingly
served by a distinctly different set of mortgage products, provided by a distinctly
different set of lenders, than those financing larger rental properties. The Survey of
Residential Finance documents [show] that by 2001, some 86 percent of all
apartment properties with 50 or more units had a mortgage, and as many as 65
percent of these properties had a level-payment, fixed-rate loan. In contrast, only 58
percent of five- to nine-unit apartment buildings had a mortgage, and just a third had
level-payment, fixed-rate mortgages.
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made up significantly less than ten percent of total securitized
multifamily volume in the late 1990s and early 2000s.83 Smaller loans
and loans for properties with five to forty-nine units mostly bypass the
secondary market altogether and remain in the domain of bank and thrift
portfolio lenders.84
In sum, the small multifamily subsector remains comparatively
underserved in the secondary mortgage market as well as in the primary
mortgage market.85 As a result, there is evidence that a ―credit gap‖ has
existed in parts of the multifamily mortgage market, particularly in the
five- to forty-nine-unit property sector.86 The question remains: should
the government intervene to shrink that gap?

Id.
83. Segal, supra note 23, at 191. Christopher Herbert, writing in 2001, noted that only
1.8% of loans in CMBS consisted of small loans. HERBERT, supra note 20, at 14. Herbert‘s
research suggests that the CMBS market does not offer lower interest rates; rather, it offers
fixed-rate financing where depositories typically offer adjustable-rate financing. Id. at vi.
Even though Fannie and Freddie‘s exposure to this submarket is small, it is larger than that of
private label CMBS players. HERBERT, supra note 20, at vii. Other actors play a significant
role in financing multifamily housing: for instance, pension funds and life insurance
companies typically finance luxury multifamily developments. MEETING MULTIFAMILY
HOUSING FINANCE NEEDS, supra note 2, at 4. Mortgage Real Estate Investment Trusts also
invest in multifamily projects.
SCHMITZ, MULTIFAMILY HOUSING DEVELOPMENT
HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 156; see Vandell, supra note 10, at 345 (discussing limited role
of mortgage REITs in multifamily finance). I have not been able to find more up-to-date data
for small multifamily securitization rates.
84. J OINT C TR . FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF H ARVARD UNIV ., T HE S TATE OF THE
NATION ‘ S HOUSING 24 (2004) [hereinafter THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2004)],
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2004.pdf (noting that in
1999, ―more than half of all multifamily loans financed by banks and thrifts had balances of
$1 million or less, compared with about 15 percent of the multifamily loans financed by‖
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). HUD‘s 1996 Property Owners and Managers Survey reveals
that depositories fund about seventy percent of mortgages for buildings with fewer than fifty
units versus forty-five percent of properties with one hundred or more units. Herbert, supra
note 20, at 13; see also THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2004), supra, at 24 (noting
that because of the history of the secondary mortgage market, two- to four-unit properties are
more readily securitized because they are grouped with single-family homes in the residential
mortgage market and are securitized as part of residential, mortgage-backed securities).
Although underwriting costs for small properties are proportionately higher, it appears that
such properties are ―comparable to larger multifamily properties in historical loan
performance.‖ Schneider & Follain, supra note 52, at 49.
85. See HUD‘s Regulation of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)
and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), 65 Fed. Reg. 65,044,
65,050 (Oct. 31, 2000) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 81) (―There is evidence that the aging stocks
of single family rental properties and small multifamily properties with 5-50 units, which play
a key role in lower-income housing, have experienced difficulties in obtaining financing.‖).
86. William Segal & Edward J. Szymanoski, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the
Multifamily Mortgage Market, 4 CITYSCAPE: J. POL‘Y DEV. & RES. 59, 65 (1998).
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III. THE CASE FOR SUBSIDIZING LANDLORDS OF SMALL PROPERTIES
HAS NOT BEEN MADE
As leading housing scholar Stegman notes, ‗―it is obvious that the
substantial owner of slum real estate is not in business for altruistic
purposes‘ . . . but since when is altruism a prerequisite for progress?‖87
Stegman and Sternlieb argue that it may benefit society to help wealthmaximizing small-apartment-building owners in order to ultimately
assist low- and moderate-income tenants.88
While I do not disagree with this general proposition, I believe that
we should be certain that any aid given to landlords will actually be
passed on in large part to their tenants, whether through lower rents or
improved conditions. As such, I question the extent to which the
government should implement affordable housing initiatives by
subsidizing small-apartment-building owners. This question is of
pressing importance because leading housing scholars believe that small
multifamily mortgages should in fact be subsidized.
Leading housing scholars have advocated for small multifamily
mortgage subsidies for over forty years. Michael Stegman has called for
decreased costs for small-property owners, even while acknowledging
that there ―is something distasteful about trying to rally support for a
group of property owners who have been considered the natural enemy
of liberal housing reformers ever since the industrial revolution.‖89
More recently, the Joint Center, along with affiliated researchers, has
called for Congress to expend public funds to develop new financing
tools, including subsidies, for small, privately-owned apartment
buildings.90
87. Stegman, supra note 7, at 423 (quoting STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 139).
88. See generally STERNLIEB, supra note 1; Stegman, supra note 7.
89. Stegman, supra note 7, at 420.
90. See, e.g., AMERICA‘S RENTAL HOUSING: THE KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL
POLICY, supra note 3, at 20. For example,
Since developing new affordable rental housing remains difficult without steep
subsidy, preserving whatever low-cost units remain should be an urgent priority.
The success of preservation efforts depends in large measure on the willingness of
Congress to appropriate sufficient funds to renew expiring project-based contracts
and fund additional efforts to slow the loss of privately owned low-cost rentals.
Id.; see William Apgar, Rethinking Rental Housing: Expanding the Ability of Rental Housing
to Serve as a Pathway to Economic and Social Opportunity 55 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of
Harvard
Univ.,
Working
Paper
No.
W04-11,
2004),
available
at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/w04-11.pdf (fleshing out a proposal for a
trust that ―could combine private capital with federal, state and local resources, while at the
same time reducing costs associated with obtaining subsidies on a project-by-project basis‖);
Revisiting Rental Housing Policy, supra note 17, at 16 (―Some owners who are interested in
continuing to operate their properties as low-cost housing will need help with capital needs;
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The Joint Center‘s William Apgar and Shekar Narasimhan have
presented perhaps the most well-developed subsidy proposal to date.91
They advocate that the federal government sponsor a ―small Real Estate
Investment Trust (S-REIT) that would aggregate ownership of older,
smaller multifamily properties with low or modest rents‖ and act as a
conduit for federal subsidies.92 From this investment vehicle, smallmultifamily-property owners would receive the following benefits: they
would incur no capital gains tax on exchanging their property for a
proportionate (and liquid) interest in the S-REIT; they would gain access
to credit at a lower price by means of the S-REIT‘s tax-exempt bond
issuing capability; and properties managed by the trust would be exempt
from recording taxes and would be eligible for local tax abatements.93
Individually, each of these benefits would confer a significant advantage
over owners of comparable properties; taken collectively, these benefits
represent a substantial subsidy channeled directly to owners of small
multifamily buildings who choose to participate in an S-REIT.
There are two main rationales for subsidizing small-building
landlords. First, they provide housing to the neediest tenants: low- and
moderate-income families who are not fortunate enough to have
obtained subsidized apartments. Second, the multifamily mortgage
market is subject to market failures that make government intervention
appropriate. I will assess these two rationales in turn.
A. The Affordability Rationale
Housing economist John Quigley writes,
―Affordability‖ is clearly the most compelling rationale for
polices [sic] subsidizing rental housing. The high cost of rental
other properties may need to be purchased to preserve affordability. While much is known
about ways to preserve subsidized developments, preservation strategies for the unassisted
stock have received little attention‖); Stegman, supra note 7, at 420. Shaun Donovan, now the
Secretary of HUD, has proposed subsidizing the cost of underwriting, servicing, and
securitization for small multifamily buildings. Shaun Donovan, Background Paper on Market
Rate Multifamily Rental Housing 21 (Millennial Hous. Comm‘n, Fin. Task Force, 2002),
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/mhc/papers/mrmf.doc. This proposal rests, it appears, on the
assumption that such a subsidy would be a relatively efficient way to increase the supply of
affordable housing. See Stegman, supra note 7, at 420.
91. Despite the repeated refrain for new financing alternatives and subsidies by
affordable-housing advocates like the Joint Center, there is surprisingly little in concrete
proposals as to how to implement policies directing subsidies to small-building owners.
92. Apgar & Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 2. The Community Preservation Corporation
(CPC) also proposed a model of MBS that was intended to address the needs of smaller (six to
twelve) unit buildings. Follain & Szymanoski, supra note 33, at 168-172 (evaluating the CPC
proposal).
93. Apgar & Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 19-20.
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housing, relative to the ability of low-income households to pay for
housing, means that these households have few resources left over
for expenditures on other goods—food, clothing, medicine—which
94
are also necessities.

Quigley‘s position applies to all affordable housing subsidies. To
make the case that it applies with special force to subsidies directed at
for-profit owners of small apartment buildings, one must argue that such
actors are better at delivering affordable housing to at least some
category of households than other actors.
And, indeed, that argument does have some merit. For instance, if
other providers of affordable housing systematically exclude some lowincome households, a case may be made that for-profit owners of small
apartment buildings do play a socially beneficial role as landlords of last
resort. There is evidence that some affordable housing providers have a
history of behaving in just this way. Public housing authorities have at
various times in their history effectively screened ―out any prospective
tenant family who for any reason might act irresponsibly or fail to
adequately care for its government-owned housing unit.‖95 Michael
94. John M. Quigley, Just Suppose: Housing Subsidies for Low-Income Renters 13
(Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Paper No. RR07-9, 2007), available at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/rental/revisiting_rental_symposium/papers/rr079_quigley.pdf, and reprinted in REVISITING R ENTAL HOUSING : P OLICIES, P ROGRAMS,
AND P RIORITIES 300 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2008); see Robert C.
Ellickson, The Mediocrity of Government Subsidies to Mixed-Income Housing Projects 3
(Yale Law Sch., John M. Olin Ctr. for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy, Paper
No. 360, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1217870 (―Most housing experts agree
that the chief challenge today is not how to improve the quality of American dwellings, but
how to make what‘s available more affordable to households on a tight budget.‖); Schnare,
supra note 22, at 27 (―Given the relatively low incomes of this nation‘s renters—and the
relatively high costs of operating and maintaining units—there is a real and unmet need for
rental subsidies.‖); see also Roger Starr, Private Ventures in Slum Building Rehabilitation for
Low-Income Families, 24 J. HOUSING 32 (1967). Starr notes that
it is clear that rehabilitation of old law tenements for low income families cannot be
done profitably without heavy subsidization—above and beyond low interest, long
term mortgages, and tax abatements. What seems to be needed are either rent
supplements, which would permit realistic rent levels, or an initial capital grant
which would help keep rents at a level that tenants could afford out of their own
earnings.
Id., quoted in Stegman, supra note 7, at 423; WINNICK, supra note 38, at 171 (―The problems
and perplexities of rental housing demonstrate that some form of government assistance has
been—and still is—an inescapable requirement for an adequate volume of new private
investment in rental housing . . . .‖).
95. Stegman, supra note 7, at 420; SCHWARTZ, supra note 59, at 105 (noting that
during the early days of public housing, ―[m]anagers conducted home visits to most applicants
to see whether their households were sufficiently orderly to qualify for public housing,‖ and
that ―[m]anagers were also not shy about evicting unruly tenants or tenants who failed to keep
their homes up to an acceptable standard of tidiness‖); Michael H. Schill & Susan W.
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Stegman therefore argues that it ―rests with the private landlord to
provide such families with housing.‖96 While Stegman wrote this over
forty years ago, his argument can hold true for federally assisted housing
providers today.97
This state of affairs is further exacerbated by the long-term
disinvestment in the nation‘s stock of subsidized affordable housing.
Since the 1980s,
the pace of government spending in general has slowed; the
problems in large-scale public housing projects are proving
intractable; the new subsidized alternative—small-scale, scatteredsite, mixed-income projects—provides housing for very few families
Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and Policy: Concentrated Poverty in
Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285, 1298 (1995) (―In the early years of the [public
housing] program, [Public Housing Authorities] had enormous latitude in admission and
eviction decisions. This freedom permitted [the housing authorities] to screen out ‗problem‘
tenants and quickly evict those who created difficulties.‖); see also NICHOLAS DAGEN
BLOOM, PUBLIC HOUSING THAT WORKED: NEW YORK IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 7
(2009) (noting that the level of scrutiny applied to public-housing applicants waxed and
waned over time and among jurisdictions).
96. Stegman, supra note 7, at 420.
97. ―Federally assisted housing‖ includes public-housing projects, Section-8 tenantbased rent vouchers, as well as housing financed, insured, constructed, and substantially
rehabilitated via federal funding. 42 U.S.C. § 13641(2) (2006). By statute, providers of
federally assisted housing are required to screen prospective tenants and may reject
households where any member is using illegal drugs, abusing alcohol, or is engaging in any
―criminal activity which would adversely affect the health, safety, or right to peaceful
enjoyment of the premises by other residents.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 13661; see also 24 C.F.R. §
960.203 (2009). Similarly, federal law provides for the termination of assistance where a
household member is found to be using drugs or abusing alcohol. 42 U.S.C. § 13662. In both
screening and termination decisions, what constitutes a disqualifying violation is left to the
discretion of the housing provider. Id. This blanket authority has prompted one publicinterest lawyer to warn that the greatest concern for advocates representing poor clients is
―overzealous officials‖ barring families with even minor criminal histories, despite the
absence of a conviction or even an arrest. John J. Ammann, Housing out the Poor, 19 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 309, 318 (2000). Further, the aggressive implementation of such ―One
Strike‖ policies to disqualify federal housing applicants has been incentivized by HUD.
Funding bonuses and freedom from federal oversight is linked, in part, to the number of
applicants a housing authority has rejected in accordance with the ―One Strike‖ initiative. See
24 C.F.R. § 902.71 (laying out incentives for housing authorities); OFFICE OF PUB. & INDIAN
HOUS., U.S. DEP‘T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., ―ONE STRIKE AND YOU‘RE OUT‖ POLICY IN
PUBLIC HOUSING (attachment to Notice No. 96-16, Apr. 12, 1996), available at
http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/notices/pih/files/96-16PIHN.doc (exhorting housing
authorities to aggressively implement ―One Strike‖ criteria in return for performance
incentives).
Compounding the difficulties faced by tenants of federally assisted housing, existing law
also empowers housing providers to disqualify entire households for the acts of a single
member, even where the family is ignorant of the offending conduct. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6);
see HUD v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 136 (2002) (affirming a public-housing operator‘s broad
authority to conduct such ―no-fault‖ evictions under the statute).
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at an exorbitant cost. It has become apparent to most that the
government simply cannot replace the private sector in the housing
market. The regulatory environment needs to reflect this new policy
awareness and encourage, or at least not discourage, private rental
98
housing ownership.

A final important factor contributing to the problem of affordability
is that a significant amount of rental housing is being demolished or
permanently taken out of service; this is particularly true in distressed
communities where the need for affordable housing is often the greatest,
but rings true in gentrifying communities as well.99
With possible ―skimming‖ of the best tenants by government and
98. Schloming & Schloming, supra note 12, at 30; see RICHARD HILTON & CHARLES
HANSON, EVALUATION OF THE MARK-TO-MARKET PROGRAM 1 (2004) (noting that from the
mid-1960s through the mid-1980s ―the Federal Government committed substantial resources
for project-based rental assistance in new or substantially rehabilitated multifamily (5 units or
more) properties for low- or moderate-income families,‖ and that ―[t]hese properties were
subsidized through a variety of different programs, but they were all provided with long-term
subsidies for specific rental units owned by private landlords‖); SCHWARTZ, supra note 59, at
34-37 (charting decrease in federal assistance for affordable housing). It should be noted that
the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit has financed more than two million units of affordable
housing since 1987. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP‘T OF THE TREASURY,
LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDITS: AFFORDABLE HOUSING INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES
FOR BANKS 1 (2008), available at www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2008-10a.pdf. While this is
a great achievement, it does not come close to meeting the need for affordable housing. See
SCHWARTZ, supra note 59, at 18-37 (summarizing serious affordability and housing condition
issues in rental-housing stock). And despite its many successes, the recent economic
downturn has destabilized the market for Low-Income Housing Tax credits. Ruth Simon et
al., Millions for Foreclosures, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2008, at C12 (―Demand for tax credits
has waned among banks and financial giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac because they
haven't been registering profits.‖). One could argue that a benefit of the Joint Center‘s
proposal is that, unlike Low-Income Housing Tax credits that cannot function well in a
contracting economy, the S-REIT would continue to operate. However, outside of a dire
recession, this is much less of a concern and should not trump considerations of how subsidies
perform under more normal circumstances.
99. AMERICA‘S RENTAL HOUSING: HOMES FOR A DIVERSE NATION, supra note 12, at
22. The report describes the problem of smaller properties at risk for removal:
Over the ten years beginning in 1993, an estimated 2.3 million rental units (6
percent) were demolished or otherwise permanently removed from the inventory.
Over half of these rentals were in older (built before 1960) one- to four-family
buildings located in the nation‘s most distressed neighborhoods . . . . As might be
expected, loss rates are higher for properties with such additional risk factors as low
rent, long-term vacancies, and structural deficiencies.
For older, smaller
multifamily units, these added risk factors push the loss rate to 13 percent.
Combining all the risk factors, including structural inadequacy, pushes the loss rate
to over 20 percent.
Id. In gentrifying communities, rental housing may be taken out of service in order to convert
it to condominiums. See generally Hans Lind & Anders Hellström, Gentrification—An
Overview of the Literature (Div. of Bldg. & Real Estate Econ., Working Paper No. 38, 2003),
available at http://www.kth.se/polopoly_fs/1.19799!38.pdf.
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not-for-profit housing providers, the long-term reduction in governmentsupported housing, and the material reduction in the stock of affordable
housing, low- and moderate-income families who did not get a
subsidized apartment have to fend for themselves in the private housing
market. As a result of these long-term trends, the Joint Center has
sought to redirect some of the focus of the housing preservation debate
from subsidized housing to ―the fate of the privately owned,
unsubsidized rental stock that serves the vast majority of low-income
renter households.‖100 Because financing costs are typically the biggest
expense for multifamily properties, ―issues related to the costs and
availability of mortgage funds have important implications for the
overall affordability of rental housing.‖101
While the affordability problem is uncontroversial and well
documented, it is unclear that the best solution for it is to reduce the
financing costs of these landlords of last resort. Before undertaking the
Joint Center approach, one must be confident that landlords will pass on
these savings to their tenants and reverse the trend of shrinking the
affordable housing stock. In other words, if the benefits of the reduction
in landlord financing costs are intended to trickle down to tenants, one
should be certain as to its rate of flow.102
James Follain and Edward Szymanoski challenge responses to the
affordability problem like that of the Joint Center: ―[I]t is wise to
consider the relative importance of multifamily mortgage credit subsidy
programs in an overall strategy to improve the delivery of housing
services to low-income households.‖103 They argue that, for a variety of
reasons, ―[t]hese subsidy programs should not rank very high.‖104
First, they argue that there is insufficient empirical evidence to
support the argument for supply-side subsidies.105 Second, they argue
that an unacceptable portion of the subsidy flows to the housing
providers and related industries.106 Third, they argue that many supply-

100. AMERICA‘S RENTAL HOUSING: HOMES FOR A DIVERSE NATION, supra note 12, at
21-22 (also noting that this ―affordable inventory consists primarily of single-family and small
multifamily units‖).
101. Schnare, supra note 22, at 4.
102. Cf. WINNICK, supra note 38, at 172 (noting that indirect government aids for rental
housing ―must be channeled through the hands of an intermediary—the private investor‖ and
that ―[c]onstant vigilance and strict regulation are required to insure that benefits will not be
absorbed before they reach the intended beneficiary‖).
103. Follain & Szymanoski, supra note 33, at 173.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 174.
106. Id.
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side subsidies are subject to improper political interference.107
Follain clearly outlines the argument against a ―trickle down,‖
supply-side subsidized multifamily mortgage policy, based on a
fundamental question: what is the price elasticity of the housing
supply?108 If the housing supply is elastic, then tenants may benefit from
reductions in the cost of providing the housing.109 But if it is inelastic,
―the primary beneficiaries of such programs are likely to be builders,
investors, and other supply-side agents.‖110 This is because reducing
production costs for an inelastic supply should not result in price
reductions—only an elastic and increasing supply would have such a
result.111 As the housing economics literature has not yet determined
whether the housing supply is elastic, it is dangerous to implement
public policy based on the assumption that it is.112
After noting the limitations inherent in such supply-side, trickledown policies, Follain and Szymanoski close their argument by pointing
to the existence of more efficient solutions to some of the problems that
a mortgage finance subsidy is intended to address.113 One such solution,
for instance, would be to pursue policies that directly benefit low- and
moderate-income households and are targeted to reduce housing costs
for tenants. Section 8, tenant-based rent vouchers are the most well

107. Id. (arguing that ―[d]emand-side programs are less prone to this type of abuse in
competitive markets for rental housing, which seems to be the typical situation‖).
108. Follain, supra note 10, at 543.
109. Elasticity of housing supply depends in turn on a variety of local factors, including
rent, zoning, land use, and building regulations.
110. Follain, supra note 10, at 544. See EDWARD L. GLAESER & JOSEPH GYOURKO,
RETHINKING FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY 64-81 (2008), for a discussion of the extreme
variability of elasticity among American housing submarkets that results from variations in
local land use regulation.
111. For example, if housing supply is elastic, developers would build more housing if
it became profitable to do so as a result of decreased financing costs. This is because
financing costs are a major element of overall housing cost.
112. Follain, supra note 10, at 544. Of course there is a certain amount of waste in any
subsidy that does not involve a direct income transfer. If one were only choosing among
producer subsidies, one must compare their comparative inefficiencies.
113. Id. Follain and Szymanoski suggest that
the complexity of multifamily lending can be reduced by simplifying the rules and
regulations surrounding nonprofit housing development organizations. Local
governments can also be encouraged to develop housing codes that are more
accommodating to projects for low-income households. Another idea usually
favored by economists is a well-structured demand-side voucher program that
encourages recipients to search the market for good and affordable housing. This
type of subsidy program is usually simpler to implement than subsidized lending
programs and is more likely to be successful.
Id.; see Ellickson, supra note 94 (comparing efficacy of vouchers to inclusionary programs).
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known of such subsidies.114 One could achieve similar results by
providing a tax credit for rent payments by low- and moderate-income
families. Ultimately, the concerns set forth by Follain and Szymanoski
regarding multifamily mortgage subsidy programs in general must be
addressed before a federal or state government should implement a new
program of subsidized, multifamily mortgage finance for small buildings
in particular.
B. The Market Failure Rationale
Follain and Szymanoski also explore ―market failure‖ as an
alternate rationale for government intervention in the multifamily
mortgage sector.115 In particular, they note that
[i]t is difficult to make a case for government intervention in the
multifamily mortgage market when using the standard model of
market failure, given the efficiencies of modern financial markets.
The case for intervention in the financial markets, if one is to be
made, is more subtle and requires a model in which uncertainty
about some future events—for example, mortgage defaults—is
explicit. Market failure in models with uncertainty is caused by two
broad categories of factors in the credit markets: uninsurable risks
116
and information costs.

The question, then, is whether the small multifamily mortgage
market suffers from uncertainty because of uninsurable risks or
information costs. While researchers in the 1980s and 1990s found that

114. See generally RICHARD HILTON ET AL., EVALUATION OF THE MARK-TO-MARKET
PROGRAM 1 (2004), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/M2MEva.pdf. The
authors note,
In 1974, Congress enacted Section 8 ―Lower Income Rental Assistance‖ under the
United States Housing Act, a program that could be either project-based or tenantbased. Rather than providing a fixed subsidy, tenants would generally pay 25
percent of their income (later increased to 30 percent) towards their rent and the
government would pay the difference.
Id.
115. Follain & Szymanoski, supra note 33, at 154. The authors describe a market
failure as follows:
[W]hen the market does not provide the quantity of a particular good or service at
which the marginal social benefits of another unit equal the marginal social costs of
producing that unit. In such a situation, the benefits to society of having one more
unit exceed the costs of producing one more unit; thus, a rationale exists for some
level of government to intervene in the market and expand the output of this good.
Id.
116. Id.; see Vandell, supra note 10, at 322 (arguing that the most compelling argument
―for government involvement in multifamily finance comes by way overcoming information
voids‖).
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there was not enough information for multifamily mortgage underwriters
to make informed decisions,117 this seems to be much less the case
today.118 To the extent that there is a market failure in the multifamily
mortgage market, it is caused in part by the large number of originators
in the small multifamily submarket. Such a low-concentration market
increases transaction costs for secondary market investors seeking to
conduct due diligence on many mortgages with different terms. As
opposed to the RMBS market, there is a great deal of variety in
multifamily mortgage documents, which increases due diligence and
legal review costs for underwriters and securitizers.119
A final question is, if one were to generally support multifamily
mortgage subsidies, whether smaller multifamily buildings should be
subsidized at the expense of larger buildings. This is an important issue
in the debate over whether to provide new supports for this housing
stock, as smaller multifamily buildings may be less efficient providers of
affordable housing than larger ones.120 To answer that question, one
117. See, e.g., Amy D. Crews et al., The Distribution of Multifamily Mortgage
Originations: What We Know and Why We Care, 6 J. HOUSING ECON. 334, 365 (1997)
(―Without better information, further development of a secondary multifamily mortgage
market is likely to go slowly and lag far behind the single-family mortgage market.‖);
Schneider & Follain, supra note 52, at 49-50 (―[R]esearch indicates that small projects make
up a niche market that is difficult and uneconomical to serve through standard multifamily
lending practices.‖).
118. AMERICA‘S RENTAL HOUSING: THE KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POLICY,
supra note 3, at 14.
119. See, e.g., Schneider & Follain, supra note 52, at 50. The authors note,
The costs to investors of due diligence on nonstandardized loan pools of small
project mortgages eliminate many pricing advantages of a structured transaction.
Efforts to increase standardization could secure more access to efficient sources of
long-term capital. However, standardization may prove difficult to accomplish
because of the heterogeneity of small project borrowers and the flexibility required
to underwrite small project loans.
Id.; see also Jean L. Cummings, Developing a Secondary Market for Affordable Rental
Housing: Lessons from the LIMAC/Freddie Mac and EMI/Fannie Mae Programs, 4
CITYSCAPE: J. POL‘Y DEV. & RES. 19, 20 (1998) (―An active secondary market requires
standardization of the mortgage contract, underwriting and mortgage documents‖). In January
2009, the Joint Center made a related market failure argument—that private lenders exit the
multifamily market during credit crises and government instrumentalities such as Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac are needed to provide liquidity. MEETING MULTIFAMILY HOUSING
FINANCE NEEDS, supra note 2, at 5. Given the problems faced by Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac during the current credit crisis, this argument is less than compelling. See David Reiss,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the Future of Federal Housing Finance Policy: A Study of
Regulatory Privilege, 61 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at
http://works.bepress.com/david_reiss/25.
120. William Apgar and Shekar Narasimhan argue that the smaller units in particular
should be preserved. For example:
With new construction focused on expanding the supply of more expensive
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should compare the cost of subsidizing a unit of a small multifamily
building to prevent it from being taken out of service to the cost of
subsidizing a unit of a large multifamily building to prevent it from
being taken out of service. In all likelihood, it is more efficient to
preserve the unit in the larger building.121 After all, large buildings bring
to bear an economy of scale that will tend to make them run more
efficiently.122 In either case, however, if the housing supply is relatively

apartments in large multifamily structures, the ongoing demolition and inventory
losses of rental units in older small multifamily structures is rapidly depleting the
available supply of affordable rental housing. Most of the privately-owned small
multifamily rental stock was built at least 30 years ago when construction
techniques and capital markets were less sophisticated and households were less
affluent. Much of this inventory is now in need of substantial repair. According to
the American Housing Survey, 3 million private market rental units have severe
structural deficiencies and are at risk of loss.
Apgar & Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 6. In addition to the criticisms set forth in the text
above, Apgar and Narasimhan fail to explicitly address the filtering process that occurs as
newer, more expensive units are added to the existing housing stock and the extent to which
that addition to the overall housing supply offsets inventory losses of older, small multifamily
units. See Matthew Edel, Filtering in a Private Housing Market, in READINGS IN URBAN
ECONOMICS 204, 204 (Matthew Edel & Jerome Rothenberg eds., 1972) (defining filtering).
They also fail to account for the fact that developments in the housing finance market such as
the FHA–insured mortgage have allowed ―the average developer to build on a larger scale.‖
WINNICK, supra note 38, at 159.
121. In order to study whether smaller buildings are less efficient tools for preserving
affordable housing, one would need to control for the quality of the housing provided by
smaller and larger buildings. Once that is done, it is very likely that the finding would be that
larger buildings are more efficient. See THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2006), supra
note 9, at 22 (noting that over the 1990s and 2000s ―new multifamily rental construction has
shifted decidedly toward larger structures‖). A further consideration is whether lower-density
housing has positive externalities that should factor into any discussion of subsidizing small
apartment buildings. This appears to be a largely unexplored area of study. There have been
numerous studies, however, that evaluate the individual and community benefits of residential
homeownership, as compared to rental tenancy. See, e.g., ROBERT D. DIETZ, THE SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES OF HOMEOWNERSHIP (Homeownership Alliance, 2003), available at
www.newtowncdc.org/pdf/social_consequences_study.pdf (surveying existing scholarship
drawn from social sciences, medicine, psychology, and other academic fields). Additionally,
there is scholarship comparing the economic and health outcomes of moving families from
high-poverty neighborhoods to low-poverty areas. See Jeffrey Kling et al., Moving to
Opportunity and Tranquility: Neighborhood Effects on Adult Economic Self-Sufficiency and
Health from a Randomized Housing Voucher Experiment 4-5 (Harvard Univ. John F.
Kennedy Sch. of Gov‘t, Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP04-035, 2004),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=588942 (finding significant mental health benefits, some
physical benefits, and no substantial economic benefits from participation in housing mobility
program). It remains, however, a completely open question whether housing density alone,
controlling for all other factors, has an impact on residents sufficient to prioritize subsidies for
small apartment buildings over those for larger buildings.
122. See MEETING MULTIFAMILY HOUSING FINANCE NEEDS, supra note 2, at 2 (citing
efficiencies in delivering social services, improving physical infrastructure, and achieving
energy independence and sustainable development goals via multifamily communities versus
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inelastic it is unlikely that even a generally available subsidy for
multifamily properties is an efficient way to reduce the rate of loss to the
affordable multifamily housing supply.123 The imposition of some form
of rent regulation on the subsidized housing would be necessary to
ensure that it remained affordable.124
Apgar and Narasimhan have given form to the repeated calls by
housing advocates to subsidize financing costs for small apartment
buildings. To give this proposal its due, it does attempt to address
aspects of the efficiency argument. To that end, Apgar and Narasimhan
argue that the proposal would ―facilitate the ownership transfer of the
critically important small-multifamily rental inventory from individual
owner to institutional investor, and in doing so help gain needed scale
economies to reduce the costs of property management, repair and
maintenance.‖125 It is highly uncertain, however, whether the economies
of scale contemplated by such a model would in fact be achieved: one
private company that believed that it could achieve such economies of
scale has found that it is much more difficult than it had foreseen.126
CONCLUSION
While it is incontrovertible that small-apartment-building owners
are not all slumlords and social parasites, the argument in favor of

single-family housing). It is reasonable to assume that such efficiencies would be amplified,
to some degree, in larger-scale multifamily housing. Apgar and Narasimhan readily admit
that ―[a]vailable evidence suggests the presence of significant economies of scale in the
operation of larger buildings.‖ Apgar & Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 22. Indeed, the heart of
their proposal is to duplicate the efficiencies of larger buildings by pooling smaller properties.
Id. at 21-24, 28. However, as argued above, there are more efficient means of promoting the
overarching goal of affordable housing.
123. Notwithstanding this concern about the small multifamily market, it is not
unreasonable to conclude, along with James Follain and Edward Szymanoski, that ―standard
contracts and data systems are public goods and government may want to invest in their
development.‖ Follain & Szymanoski, supra note 33, at 161. Such an investment would
obviously be much more modest than an ongoing subsidy to landlords themselves.
124. To be clear, Apgar and Narasimhan‘s S-REIT proposal does not call for mandatory
subsidized rents or tenant income limits on the units owned by the S-REIT. While writing
that affordability could be enhanced by combining the S-REIT program with rental subsidies,
at base the program relies on market mechanisms to preserve affordable housing: ―Even
without subsidy, the [S-REIT] approach would help stem the loss of many small multifamily
properties. In doing [so,] it alleviates the ongoing pressure on market rents that undermine the
well being of the nation‘s lowest income renters.‖ Apgar & Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 27.
125. Apgar, supra note 90, at 55.
126. See James R. Hagerty, Beware the Foreclosure Allure—Redbrick’s Model of
Scattered Bets Is Cautionary Tale, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2008, at C19 (noting that privatesector investor in scattered small apartment buildings did not achieve economies of scale but,
rather, faced high costs).
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subsidizing the financing costs for such property owners has not been
won. At best, its proponents might argue that it is a realpolitik response
to the fact that direct subsidies to the poor are politically impractical, so
it is better to support an industry—the housing industry—that provides
services to the poor and is organized enough to defend those
subsidies.127
For a more principled defense, proponents of small-apartmentbuilding subsidy programs will need to respond to the concerns outlined
above: is it a relatively efficient subsidy? Is it responding to a market
failure? Those who favor such subsidies appear to have succumbed to a
logical fallacy: they argue that because small buildings provide
affordable housing and are at risk of loss, the most efficient way to
protect affordable housing is to preserve these small buildings. For the
reasons outlined above, that conclusion does not follow: the
indiscriminate subsidy of financing costs for the owners of small
multifamily buildings has not been demonstrated to be good public
policy. More carefully targeted uses of government subsidies are
therefore warranted to achieve housing affordability for low- and
moderate-income households.

127. Ellickson, supra note 94, at 30-31.

